In partial equilibrium, a reduction in import barriers may be thought to lead to an increase in imports and a reduction in trade surplus. However, the general equilibrium e¤ect can go in the opposite direction. For example, China's accession to the WTO in 2001 could lead to a surge in its current account surplus (and the conclusion of the trade reform phase by 2007 could lead to a subsequent reduction in its surplus). We study how trade reforms a¤ect current accounts by embedding a modi…ed Heckscher-Ohlin structure and an endogenous discount factor into an intertemporal model of current account. We show that trade liberalizations in a developing country would generally lead to capital out ‡ow. In contrast, trade liberalizations in a developed country would
result in capital in ‡ow. Thus, e¢ cient trade reforms can contribute to global current account imbalances, but these imbalances do not need policy "corrections".
JEL Classi…cation Numbers: F3 and F4

Introduction
There are three ways to think of a country's current account. First, it is trade balance plus net international factor payment. Because the last item is small for most countries, current account surplus (de…cit) tends to move in tandem with trade surplus (de…cit). Second, the current account is also equal to net capital out ‡ows. Third, the current account re ‡ects the di¤erence between a country's national savings and national investment. In this paper, we explore how a general equilibrium approach that integrates the three perspectives alters one's usual (partial equilibrium) intuition about the e¤ect of trade reforms on current account. We show that this approach provides novel insights on the causes (and future evolution) of the so-called global current account imbalances. In particular, a part of the current account imbalances can be an equilibrium response to welfare-improving trade liberalization. While the word "imbalance" often has a negative connotation, a current account imbalance that arises for this reason is e¢ cient in principle and does not need a policy correction.
Global current account imbalances have exhibited a rapid rise since 2002, as represented, for example, by a surge in China's current surplus from a modest 2% of GDP in 2002 to over 14% in 2007, and a surge in the US current account de…cit from about 3% to about 7% during the same period. This has generated anxiety and calls for measures to "correct"the imbalances. At the same time, world trade, measured as the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP, has grown …ve times in real terms since 1980. All groups of emerging markets and developing countries, when aggregated by income group, have been catching up with or surpassing high-income countries in their trade openness. In particular, the ratio of imports and exports to GDP in low income countries has increased from about 20% in 1990 to more than 40%, and the average tari¤ rate in low income countries has declined from about 60% to 15%. 1 Interestingly, both the Chinese surplus and the US de…cit started to narrow after 2007. In this paper, we study how trade liberalizations (and factor market reforms) may have played a role both in the initial rise in the current account imbalances and the subsequent fall of the imbalances.
In our theory, both trade liberalization and factor market reforms matter for current account. For concreteness, we …rst motivate our story using China as an example (though the underlying economic message goes beyond a single country). One's …rst reaction may be no. The WTO accession requires China to reduce its import barriers without corresponding changes in its trade partners'import barriers. Shouldn't that lead to a rise in China's imports and therefore a fall in China's trade surplus? However, that reaction represents a partial equilibrium intuition. The general equilibrium e¤ect could be very di¤erent. It is important to note that China's import competing sectors are likely to be more capital intensive than its export sectors. When China is forced to cut down its import barriers, the increase in imports should lead to a contraction of the import-competing sectors. In general equilibrium (and ignoring the non-tradable sector for simplicity), the export sectors would expand in response. Since the export sectors are labor intensive, the adjustment in the production structure towards a more labor intensive sector in China would imply a reduced demand for capital and therefore a relative surplus of capital, for a given level of savings, as a result of its trade liberalization. When the "excess"capital is exported abroad, China's current account surplus increases. As another way to see it, a reduction in the import barriers on the capital-intensive good tends to reduce the domestic return to capital, all else equal. This is the intuition one gets from the Stolper-Samuelson theorm in the classic trade theory. If the pre-liberation return to capital was equal to the world interest rate, the import liberalization upsets the equilibrium. To restore equilibrium, the country may export capital (i.e., run a current account surplus) until the domestic return to capital rises to the pre-liberalization level. This heuristic explanation takes savings as given.
Of course, savings would be endogenous in a dynamic model. The …rst key objective of this paper, therefore, is to develop a dynamic model and clarify when this general equilibrium e¤ect can happen.
It is important to note that trade liberalizations would generally induce an opposite current account response in a high-income (or capital abundant) country. Reductions in trade barriers in a capital-abundant country tend to be concentrated in the labor-intensive sector, causing a contraction of the labor-intensive sector and an expansion of the capitalintensive sector. At a given savings rate, the country would experience a shortage of capital and a rise in the return to capital. This would attract a capital in ‡ow, i.e., creating a current account de…cit.
Factor market frictions could a¤ect the current account response to trade reforms by blocking or slowing down structural transformations. The second key objective of this paper is to study interactions between trade reforms and factor market frictions. We …nd that with credit constraints, trade reforms in a developing country tend to produce a current account surplus, but with a magnitude that is smaller than without credit constraints. This suggests that trade reforms that are also accompanied by factor market reforms are likely to produce a greater current account response than without factor market reforms.
By coincidence, the quotas on many textile and garment products imposed by the United and Wei, forthcoming). Under our theory, this reduction in barriers to China's labor intensive exports would also lead to a reduction in the domestic return to capital. To restore equilibrium, China would exhibit a surplus in its current account and export its capital. Given China's size, the rest of the world has to have a matching current account de…cit.
Moreover, the end of MFA also represents one of the most signi…cant trade liberalizations for the United States (and to a lesser extent, the European Union) in recent years. This, by itself, could generate a current account e¤ect for these countries. If the United States has a more ‡exible labor market than the European Union, our theory would predict that the e¤ect is stronger for the United States.
The Chinese WTO accession also accelerated …nancial sector reforms in the country, especially during 2002-2006. According to our theory, this …nancial sector reform should complement the trade reforms and help produce an even bigger current account surplus than otherwise would have been the case. This paper is related to several papers on the cause of global current account imbalances.
Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) highlight the role of di¤erence in …nancial development. Countries with a relatively low …nancial development (e.g., China) cannot produce enough …nancial assets at home to absorb all the savings. As a result, they have exported part of their savings to countries with better …nancial development (e.g., the United States). As a result, countries like China run a current account surplus, and countries like the United States run a de…cit. Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) also feature the role of …nancial imperfections in China in generating its current account surplus. It stresses the inability of productive domestic private …rms to borrow from the formal …nancial sector as key …nancial sector frictions.
As the share of these …rms grows in the economy, so does the country's current account surplus. In both papers, when China's …nancial market develops (including improvement in access to …nance by private …rms), the country's current account surplus should decline rather than increase. This appears to be the opposite of what one observes in the data.
Our theory in this paper will suggest that factor market reforms such as improvements in the …nancial market will reinforce the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the current account.
A di¤erent theory about the rise of current account imbalances is given by Du and Wei (2010) , which suggests that a rise in the relative surplus of men in China since 2002 may have triggered a competitive race to raise household savings by families with a son. As the sex ratio deteriorates progressively, the faster rise of the savings rate than investment rate produces a progressively larger current account surplus since 2002. Wei and Zhang (2011) provide empirical evidence that suggests that higher sex ratios may explain about 50% of the increase in Chinese household savings from 1990 to 2007. While this paper also examines the cause of the Chinese current account surplus (and global current account imbalances in general), the underlying mechanism is very di¤erent. Logically, these explanations (…nancial development, sex ratio imbalance, and trade reforms) can be compatible with each other, and collectively generate the type of current account imbalances that we see in the data.
A few papers have examined the empirical relationship between trade reforms and current account such as Ostry and Rose (1992) and Ju, Wu, and Zeng (2010). They generally …nd that the relationship is ambiguous. Our model provides a natural explanation: the e¤ect of the current account response to trade reforms depends on whether the country is capital abundant or labor abundant, and also on the nature of domestic factor market frictions. When one mixes di¤erent types of countries in a sample, and disregards factor market features, it is not surprising to …nd an ambiguous e¤ect.
In terms of modeling methodology, our paper is related to a small but growing literature that considers multiple tradable sectors with di¤erent factor intensities in a general equilibrium framework. These papers include Cunat 
Suggestive Empirical Patterns
Before we present a formal model, it is useful to have more stylized facts beyond the China example. To this end, we examine the current account experience of all countries that have experienced a major trade policy change in the last two decades. More precisely, we adopt a two-step procedure. First, we identify episodes of large trade policy changes for all countries since 1990 (for which the relevant data are available). Second, for each country in this sample, we measure changes in the country's capital intensity and examine its relationship with changes in the country's current account.
We de…ne a trade reform episode as one that simultaneously satis…es two criteria: (a) there is a reduction in the country's average tari¤ rate (either the simple-weighted tari¤ or the trade-weighted tari¤) by 3 percentage points or more in one or two years; and (b) there is an increase in the country's imports-to-GDP ratio by 3 percentage points any time in the …rst, second or the third year after the tari¤ reduction relative to the year before the reform.
Some trade reforms may result in a decline in the country's capital intensity in its production, while others may produce an increase in capital intensity. Our theory suggests that the current account consequence of trade reforms may di¤er in these two cases. We now perform a simple check on whether, following a major trade policy change, the change in a country's current account pattern is systematically related to the change in its capital intensity.
It is relatively straightforward to measure current account (as a percent of GDP) and its change. How do we measure a change in capital intensity? Our approach is to measure the capital intensity of the country's export structure before and after the trade policy change.
(Ideally, we would like to measure the capital intensity of the country's entire production structure, but we do not have as good data on the sector-level production as that on sectorlevel exports.) We do it in two steps. First, we use the 2002 US Standard Make and Use Tables (from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis) to compute capital intensity for each HS 6-digit sector. Second, for a given country in the sample in any given year, we can compute the average capital intensity of its export bundle. Our maintained assumption is that the capital intensity of a sector is a technological feature that does not change across countries.
(Actually what we need is a somewhat weaker assumption: the ranking of sectors in terms of capital intensity, rather than the absolute values of capital intensity, is highly correlated A list of the 38 trade reform episodes is provided in Table 1 . A * is a¢ xed to the country episodes if we also have the relevant data on current account and capital intensity that are not obvious outliers. There are 28 country episodes that receive a *.
We present a simple scatter plot in Figure 2 of changes in current account (as a share of GDP) against changes in capital intensity. A negative relationship between the two variables is visible, and is not driven by any obvious outlier. On average, a trade policy change that leads to a reduction in the capital intensity of the economy tends to be followed by an improvement in the current account balance.
We then perform the following simple regression:
where (
) and k j represent the change in country j's current account to GDP ratio, and the change in the average capital intensity of its export bundle, respectively, while X j are other control variables such as the change in the real exchange rate. In Column 1 of Table 2 , we report the basic regression result. The regression show a negative and statistically signi…cant relationship between the change in capital intensity and change in current account. The coe¢ cient of course simply captures the slope of the …tted line in In Column 2, we add the change in country j's real exchange rate over the same period of the trade policy change as a control variable. Because we do not have information on price level (or in ‡ation) for several countries in the sample, the regression sample is greatly reduced to only 13 countries. In any case, the coe¢ cient on the real exchange rate is negative and statistically signi…cant, suggesting a rise in the real exchange rate tends to be associated with a decline in a country's current account. More importantly, we continue to …nd a negative coe¢ cient on capital intensity: a rise in a country's capital intensity tends to be associated with a deterioration of its current account.
Because of the small sample size, we are not able to have many control variables. We also do not investigate potential endogeneity of the regressors. We therefore treat the empirical pattern as suggestive rather than de…nitive. In the rest of the paper, we provide a theory of current account response to trade policy changes that is consistent with this pattern in the data.
The Basic Model
Our model, in a nutshell, marries a Heckscher-Ohlin structure (with two tradable sectors of di¤erent factor intensities) and a small open-economy intertemporal framework. However, we have to introduce two twists to address two technical challenges.
First, we have to confront an inherent tension between the two frameworks, which is the problem of interest rate over-determination. In the standard intertemporal model of current account, the interest rate in the steady state is determined by the time discount factor from the demand side. In the HO model, if the economy is within the diversi…cation cone, the interest rate is determined by the zero pro…t conditions from the supply side (i.e., the interest rate and the wage are completely determined by the prices of the goods). In general, the two interest rates from the two approaches would not be the same except by coincidence. Even assuming the two are the same initially, a permanent shock such as trade liberalization would cause the two implied interest rates to diverge again. This problem was raised by Stiglitz (1970) when he shows that, in a dynamic HO model, unless two countries have identical discount factors one country must specialize. To avoid interest rate overdetermination, we incorporate a version of an endogenous discount factor following Uzawa The usual motivation for an endogenous discount factor in a dynamic open-economy model is either to make the steady state di¤erent from initial conditions or to make the current account adjustment more persistent. We assume an endogenous discount factor primarily to solve the challenge of over-determination of the interest rate.
Convex adjustment costs for international asset position can also make the steady state independent of initial conditions. In our context, this assumption helps to address the technical challenge of multiplicity of equilibria. With linear costs of trade in goods and/or capital, corner solutions occur: either goods trade or capital ‡ow takes place, but goods trade and capital ‡ow do not coexist. 2 Once we assume convex costs of adjusting international asset position, we can pin down equilibrium capital ‡ows and current account. In an extension of the model when we introduce costs of adjustment of labor and capital across sectors, the multiple equilibria problem is resolved as well.
Household
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical and in…nitely lived households that can be aggregated into a representative household. The representative household's preference over consumption ‡ows is summarized by the following time-separable utility function
where C s is the household's consumption of a …nal good at date s, and s is the discount factor between period 0 and t as given by
where 0 = 1 and
We assume that the endogenous discount factor does not depend on the household's own consumption and income, but rather on the economy-wide average per capita consumptionC s and income e Y s , which the representative household takes as given. 3 The exact functional form of (C s ; e Y s ) will be presented later.
The household owns both factors of production, capital K and labor L. For simplicity, we assume a …xed labor supply. Therefore, the budget constraint and the capital accumulation equation faced by the representative household are given, respectively, by
where I t is investment in period t, and w t and r t are the wage and the domestic return to capital, while r is the world interest rate. is the capital appreciation rate and k is the aggregate capital adjustment cost coe¢ cient. The tari¤ revenue, T R t is rebated in a lump sum to the representative consumer, which is taken as exogenous by the consumer. 5 The …rst order conditions with respect to C t ; I t ; K t+1 ; and B t+1 ; give intertemporal and intra-temporal optimization conditions
where t and t are Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital, respectively.
Production
The production function for the …nal good is Y t = G(D 1t ; D 2t ); where D it is the usage of intermediate good i by the …nal good producer. The production function for the intermediate
can be understood as units of e¤ ective labor. All production functions are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. D it and X it can di¤er due to international trade.
The unit cost function for X it is i ( wt A it ; r t ). Let P i be the domestic price of intermediate
We assume that the country's endowment is always within the diversi…cation cone so that both intermediate goods are produced. In each period t, free entry and zero pro…ts in both the intermediate good and the …nal good markets imply that
; r t ) (3.9)
(3.10)
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, trade in intermediate goods equalizes (tari¤-inclusive) good prices between the home country and the rest of the world in every period. Without loss of generality, we assume that sector 1 is labor intensive while sector 2 is capital intensive. Considering a labor abundant country which exports labor intensive good 1, we have:
where P it denotes the world price and is exogenously given, and is the import tari¤.
Following the standard assumptions in the Hecksher-Ohlin model, we assume that production functions (and the unit cost functions) in all countries are the same (although the labor-augmenting productivity can be di¤erent). Therefore, in the foreign country we also have:
For simplicity, we assume that the rest of the world is in steady state so the return to capital, r , is a constant. We will leave out the time subscript for all foreign variables from now on. We have the following market clearing conditions in the home country
Equation (3.15) implies that the …nal good is used not only for consumption and investment, but also for covering the costs of adjusting the international asset position. The current account balance over period t is de…ned as CA t = B t+1 B t ; thus, noting that P it X it = w t L it + r t K it and using equations (3.10) and (3.15)), we can rewrite the budget constraint as
That is, the current account balance is equal to the trade balance (evaluated at the world prices) plus the interest income from the net foreign asset position. For future reference, we de…ne the domestic gross product as
Equilibrium Analysis
To study the equilibrium explicitly, we adopt the following standard functional forms for preference and technology. The utility function is U (C t ) =
, where is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The production function for the …nal good
, where ! is the share of intermediate good D 1 in the …nal good production. The production function for intermediate
, where a i is the capital share in producing intermediate good i. We let 1 < 2 so that sector 1 is labor intensive. The endogenous discount factor takes the following function form:
where 1 > 0 and 2 > 0. C and Y are, respectively, the consumption and output levels in the initial steady state with tari¤ 0 . This form is a variant of Choi, Mark and Sul (2008).
It implies that in the steady state after tari¤ reforms, the endogenous discounted factor would deviate from the constant . To make the model parsimonious, we assume 1 = 2 = .
The E¤ects of Trade Liberalizations
For simplicity, we assume that A 1 = A 2 = 1. In equilibrium, given the production functions, from Equation (3.9), we have
which give increases), the return to capital declines.
These results (in a dynamic setting) are consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in a static HO model. That is, an increase in the price of a good will increase the return to the factor used more intensively in that good, and reduce the return to the other factor.
A tari¤ reduction in the capital intensive sector implies a decrease in the price of capital intensive goods, therefore, r t decreases but w t increases.
It is worth emphasizing that the discussion points to a natural asymmetry between developed (capital abundant) and developing (labor abundant) countries. Trade liberalizations tend to reduce the domestic return to capital for a developing country, but to raise it for a developed country.
Net Foreign Asset Positions
We consider two cases of the e¤ects on net foreign asset positions, B t : First, in the transitional dynamics, we assume that the investment adjustment cost k is zero. Using equations (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), we obtain:
The holding of foreign bond B t+1 is a function of r t+1 and @B t+1 @r t+1
< 0. Second, in the steady state, using …rst order conditions (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8), we obtain:
That is, when the return to capital in the country decreases, capital ‡ows out so that the net foreign asset declines in the steady state. Note that the result for net foreign asset positions does not likely depend on the assumption of an endogenous discount factor, (C t; e Y t ): For any form of discount factor (endogenous or exogenous), the net foreign asset position must decrease if the domestic interest rate declines. We summarize our discussion by the following proposition: and P2t = (1 + tc + )P 2 : It is immediately seen that a reduction in trade cost will increase the price of the labor intensive good, P1t; but reduce P2t:
Similar to the analysis of the tari¤ reduction, a reduction in trade cost will result in a decrease in r: On
Steady State
Using the Euler equation in the steady state (3.7) and the function of endogenous discount factor (4.17), we solve for the ratio of consumption to income. consumption, C; investment I and Gross Domestic Product, Y and sectoral outputs X 1 and X 2 from the set of equations listed in Appendix 7.1. We can write the sectoral outputs as below
The optimization conditions for the …nal good producer yield
Thus the exports of intermediate good 1 are given by
the other hand, if the home country were a capital abundant country and exporting good 2, we would have
and P1t = (1 + tc + )P 1 : Now a reduction in tari¤ or trade cost would reduce the price of the labor intensive good, P1t; but increase P2t; which would increase r:
Finally, the factor usages and capital intensities in sector i are given by
A tari¤ cut in the capital intensive sector will lead to an expansion of the labor intensive sector, and a contraction of the capital intensive sector. As a result, labor and capital ‡ow from the capital intensive sector to the labor intensive sector, and both exports and imports go up.
Calibrations in the Basic Model
To calibrate the basic model, we follow the standard approach (as in Backus, Kehoe, and Table 2 . We set the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution = 2, the steady state discount factor = 0:99, which implies a 4 percent annual world interest rate. We assume an equal share of the intermediate goods in the …nal good production, so ! = 0:5. We choose 1 = 0:33 and 2 = 0:7 so that both the average labor share and the average dispersion of the labor shares in the model economy are the same as those estimated from China's input-output Table in 2002. We set capital adjustment cost k = 4 so the elasticity of Tobin's Q with respect to the investment capital ratio is 0.1, which is within the range reported in the literature. We set the annual depreciation rate of capital at 10%, which implies = 0:025: Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the coe¢ cient for bond adjustment costs, b , is set to be 0:0007. We set = 0:1, which is close to the value chosen by Choi, Mark and Sul (2008). A summary of the parameter choices is presented in the following table. In the initial steady state, the economy is assumed to impose a 15% tari¤ on imports of the capital intensive good, while the rest of the world has no tari¤. We further choose the values of the productivity parameters to make r = r so that B = 0, and the domestic wage is lower than that in the rest of the world. We cannot use the Euler equation to determine the level of aggregate consumption C and output Y as there are multiple equilibria. As long as the country's capital-labor ratio K=L is between
; any level of capital stock K could be an equilibrium. A smaller K simply implies that the country would export more labor intensive good and import more capital intensive good. We use the country's export share, therefore, to select the equilibrium in the initial steady state. The mathematical derivations are relegated to Appendix 7.2.
For the initial productivity, we set A 1 = 0:8 and A 2 = 0:50207 so that in the initial steady state, given the tari¤ level, the returns to capital across countries are equalized and the wage in the domestic economy is lower than that in the rest of the world.
We consider two policy experiments of reducing the import tari¤ by 5 and 10 percentage points, respectively. In columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 4 , we report the values for both the initial steady state (when the tari¤=15%) and the new steady states (when the tari¤ = 10% and 5%, respectively). The numerical results con…rm Proposition 1. In particular, the return to capital declines while the wage rate rises; the labor intensive sector expands while the capital intensive sector shrinks; and the labor intensive sector exports more while the capital intensive sector imports more. Most interestingly, capital ‡ows out of the country.
A relatively moderate tari¤ reduction (from 15% to 10%) results in a signi…cant capital out ‡ow, so that the increase in the foreign asset holding is on the order of 29% of the country's GDP. A tari¤ reduction by 10 percentage points (from 15% to 5%) leads to an even greater increase in foreign asset holding to 56% of GDP.
There are also interesting byproducts of the trade reforms. In particular, the domestic capital stock, K; increases; the consumption to GDP ratio declines while the investment to GDP ratio increases. These are consistent with theoretical results discussed in equation In Figure 3 , we report the dynamic paths of the economy from the initial to the new steady state after a 5 percentage points cut in the tari¤ (from 15% to 10%). We assume that the trade liberalization starts to hit the economy in period 1. We …nd that the structural adjustment takes place immediately. In particular, sector 1 (the labor intensive sector) expands immediately with an increase in K 1 ; L 1 ; and X 1 ; while sector 2 contracts immediately, with a decline in K 2 ; L 2 ; and X 2 . As a result, both the export share sx and import share sm increase immediately. The consumption response is somewhat non-standard. There is a decline in the …rst several periods; after that, consumption rises gradually. (As noted earlier, the consumption in the new steady state is still lower than in the initial steady state.) Due to a sharp rise in output, we can …nd that the ratio of consumption to output declines, which implies a higher saving rate after a tari¤ reduction. This is because the return to domestic capital declines, which implies that the domestic capital stock is larger.
Also, the household sends some of the savings abroad. Both of these require the household to consume less (as a proportion of income).
In Figure 4 , we report the dynamic paths for some key balance-of-payments items for the same trade reform experiment. We observe that the trade volume (the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP), trade surplus and current account surplus all jump immediately.
While the current account stays positive throughout the transition and approaches zero in the long run, the net foreign asset position B=GDP increases gradually to the new steady state level (of 29% of GDP). In response to the trade liberalization, the economy runs a persistent trade surplus, initially on the order of 5 percent of GDP. In the long run (after 20 quarters), however, the economy will run a trade de…cit, which is balanced out by the interest payment of the foreign asset.
We now perform some sensitivity analysis. 
Factor Market Frictions
We now investigate how factor market reforms can interact with trade reforms to a¤ect a country's current account. For the current account to respond to trade reforms, a key intermediary step is the structural adjustment of the domestic economy -the contraction of the capital intensive sector and the expansion of the labor intensive sector -leads to a mismatch between the aggregate saving and the new domestic absorption of capital.
This produces a current account response. Logically, factor market frictions that block and reduce the extent of the domestic structural adjustment can also reduce the current account response to trade reforms. We start with …nancial frictions in the form of credit constraints.
Financial Frictions
Following Antras and Caballero (2009), we make the simplifying assumption that …nancial frictions are asymmetric in the two sectors: while …rms in the importing sector can employ any desired amount of capital at the equilibrium interest rate, …rms in the exporting sector face credit constraints. Note that with a tari¤ cut on the capital intensive good, only the (labor-intensive) export sector would expand. Therefore, we essentially assume that credit constraints are more binding in the sector that needs expansion.
Credit constraints are introduced through the following (admittedly arti…cial) setting.
Each capitalist owns one unit of capital so that the capital stock K is owned by a total K of capitalists. A proportion of K are endowed with "entrepreneurial ability"and labelled "entrepreneurs". Only the "entrepreneurs" know how to operate in the exporting sector.
However, each entrepreneur can borrow only up to amount of her own capital. Thus the total amount of capital employed in the exporting sector is given by,
where k = (1 + ) : We focus on the case in which …nancial frictions are binding (or is su¢ ciently small) so that k K is less than the desired amount of capital that exporting …rms would like to employ in the absence of …nancial frictions.
Let r i be the return to capital in sector i: The …nancial frictions cause a wedge between the returns to capital in the two sectors, r 1t > r 2t . The budget constraint (3.3) now is changed to
In addition to the capital accumulation equation, the representative household also faces the credit constraint (5.29) and capital market clearing condition,
Using these results, the budget constraint (3.3) now becomes:
Therefore, the …rst order conditions with respect to C t ; K t+1 ; B t+1 ; and L it in the consumer's maximization problem now remain the same as conditions (3.5), (3.7), and (3.8) except that we now replace r t+1 by r C t+1 = k r 1;t+1 + (1 k ) r 2;t+1 (5.32)
The Steady State Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium in the case of …nancial frictions is represented by 15 equations with 15 variables, and is summarized in Appendix 7.3. Similar to equation (4.22) , in the steady state we have
Thus, r C = k r 1 + (1 k ) r 2 ; is a key variable in determining the country's net foreign asset holding B:
Because we are not able to obtain an analytic solution, we will resort to numerical results. Here we o¤er some intuition for the numerical results to come. When …nancial frictions become tighter ( k declines), the capital usage in sector 1 declines. As a result, the marginal product of capital in the exporting sector, r 1 ; increases, but the marginal product of labor, w 1 ; declines. Since the wage rates are equalized in the two sectors in the steady state, w 1 = w 2 = w, using the zero pro…t condition in the import-competing sector,
; r 2 ); we infer that the marginal product of capital in the import-competing sector, r 2 must rise. Since both r 1 and r 2 are larger, therefore, r C becomes larger as …nancial frictions becomes tighter. Using 
Labor Market Frictions
We can model labor frictions in a similar fashion and obtain qualitatively similar results.
Assume that labor employed in the exporting sector requires "exporting skills", and the amount of labor with "exporting skills" does not exceed a certain proportion of the total amount of labor. In other words, when the labor-intensive sector expands, not all labor previously working in the importing sector can successfully function in the exporting sector.
As an example, when the textile industry expands but the steel mills are shut down, not all former steel workers can be productive textile workers. Formally, we model the frictions by the following inequality:
Similarly, the budget constraint (3.3) now becomes
and all the analysis in the basic model goes through except that now we replace w t by
Labor market frictions impede the expansion of the exporting sector. Thus a given trade reform produces a smaller response in both the trade volume and the current account.
Numerical Results
We focus on the case of credit constraints, while assuming no labor market frictions. We choose the same structural parameters as in the benchmark case. For …nancial frictions, we set the credit constraint parameter in the initial steady state k = 0:42 so that the initial net export share is about 10%.
The case of a tari¤ reduction from 15% to 10% under …nancial frictions is presented in Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 . The return to capital in the importing sector, r 2 ; decreases, but r 1 in the exporting sector increases. The labor intensive sector expands while the capital intensive sector shrinks, and both exports and imports increase. While the qualitative result is the same as the case without …nancial frictions (Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 ), the magnitude of the changes is (much) smaller. Because the (labor-intensive) export sector cannot expand as much as before, the wage rate now declines. The ratio of the trade volume to GDP increases by 3:7 percentage points (from 21:1% to 24:8%), compared to an increase by 6:6 percentage points when there is not credit constraint. The increase in the net foreign asset position, B=GDP; is on the order of 10% of GDP when there is credit constraint, compared to an increase by 29% of GDP in the absence of credit constraints.
If the tari¤ is cut to 5%, the new steady state (with credit constraint) is presented in Column 7 of Table 4 . Again, comparing the change in the country's foreign asset position from Columns 5 to 7, with the change in the same variable from Column 2 to 4, it is clear that credit constraint can substantially reduce the change in a country's foreign asset position for a given trade reform.
We present, in Figure 6 , the transitional dynamics of the economy after a tari¤ cut from 15% to 10% in the case with credit constraints. Compared to Figure 3 (the transitional dynamics after an identical tari¤ cut but without credit constraint), the adjustments are smaller. We present, in Figure 7 Note, however, that we do not wish to claim that trade reforms are the only factor that matters for the evolution of a country's current account. Rather, it is an important contributing factor that is thus far neglected in the discussion of global current account imbalances. Such a neglect could incorrectly color our understanding of the source of current account imbalances and appropriate policy responses. To put it simply, if a portion of the current account imbalances is caused by e¢ cient trade reforms, we do not need to view it as a problem that needs a policy correction.
We will see many more trade policy changes in both developed and developing countries (not always in the direction of reducing trade barriers). We will also see many more changes in factor markets around the world that could either enhance or reduce their ‡exibility. This paper suggests that the general equilibrium pattern of the current account response to a trade policy change can be very di¤erent from the partial equilibrium intuition.
Appendix
Equations for the Steady State
Given the factor prices (w; r) and the holding of foreign asset B, the output Y , consumption C, investment I, aggregate demand D, and sectoral outputs X 1 and X 2 can be determined by the following six equations.
where = ! + (1 !)=(1 + ). Equation (7.6) is derived from the current account equation in the steady state,
Equilibrium Selection in the Initial Steady State
In the initial steady state, we assume an exogenous export share, sx; and an import share, sm; to select the equilibrium. Let
Since B is initially zero, using expressions of sectoral output, we have
Using the expressions for X 1 and D 1 , we have
This implies that given the initial share of export sx, we can determine the initial ratio of wage income to …nal good expenditure as below
In the initial steady state, the consumption is given by C = D I P , and the investment is given by I = K = r ( 1 P 1 X 1 + 2 P 2 X 2 ). From the determination of sectoral output, we have
(1 + ) For simplicity, we rewrite it as
Note that is an investment component determined by the supply side. Therefore, substituting them into the aggregate demand equation, the initial consumption can be expressed
Finally, we obtain the initial consumption as below:
7.3 Steady State Equilibrium with Credit Constraint
wL 1 = (1 1 )P 1 X 1 (7.14)
(7.19) Note: * denotes countries for which data on current account and capital intensity are also available. 
